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Chapter 8 
Ambiguity, Ambivalence and Absence in Zero Dark Thirty 
Lisa Purse 
 
Zero Dark Thirty, Kathryn Bigelow’s 2013 film about the ten year hunt for Osama bin Laden, has 
provoked competing accusations: that it is either anti-war or pro-war, anti-torture or pro-torture, and 
left wing or right wing in its political convictions. The heat of the assertions on either side of the 
debate (Naomi Wolf (2013) famously accused Bigelow of being ‘torture’s handmaiden’) illustrates 
the extent to which the film’s subject matter — the post-9/11 counter-terrorism strategies deployed by 
the US Military and government agencies — itself continues to provoke vociferous political and 
cultural discussion. Not for the first (or last) time in American cinema history, a film becomes the site 
at which a nationally felt ambivalence — in this case, about US actions carried out in the name of the 
so-called ‘war on terror’ — is explored. Zero Dark Thirty has caused controversy not only because of 
its subject matter, but because of its ambiguity. The debates around the film have focused most 
intently on key elements of what is presented on-screen: the scenes of torture, the character of Maya 
(played by Jessica Chastain), and the killing of bin Laden. These have provoked strikingly contrasting 
interpretations, drawn from the same filmmaking decisions, and the same screen details. Thus Zero 
Dark Thirty has become what Frank Tomasulo once, in relation to a different war film, called a 
‘national Rorschach test’ (Tomasulo 1990: 147).1  In this essay I want to unpick these ambiguities, to 
consider if Zero Dark Thirty gives voice to or counters a felt ambivalence about the war on terror, by 
examining what has sometimes slipped from view in the heated discussion of its scenes of torture and 
killing. That is, what absences might the compelling presences of Zero Dark Thirty obscure?  
 
Ambivalence and presence: locating ambiguity 
The film’s moments of ambiguity — moments whose intended import can be interpreted in more than 
one way — are numerous, and I will examine some of these in what follows. Such a preponderance of 
ambiguity has the effect of producing political ambivalence at the structural level: that is, the film 
itself literally becomes a container for contradictory ideas and interpretations, allowing spectators who 
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hold contrasting views to each see their convictions reflected in the text itself. Where felt ambivalence 
generally describes an individual or group’s misgivings about a subject, structural ambivalence is 
simply the state of containing or permitting more than one viewpoint or interpretation at once. 
Structural ambivalence is often designed into American films that wish to address controversial 
subject matter without alienating parts of their audience, a strategy that, as Richard Maltby points out, 
‘displaces responsibility for the interpretation of a movie’s content onto its audience’ so that studios 
themselves are not accused of holding partisan political views (2003: 275; see also Tomasulo 1990: 
147). One of the questions that Zero Dark Thirty prompts is how far one might perceive a felt 
ambivalence in the film’s presentation of its subject, in addition to the structural ambivalence that is 
designed in.  
 
The presence that seems most compelling for reviewers and commentators is that of Maya, the 
composite CIA agent who succeeds, in the film, in finding bin Laden. First encountered in the 
opening torture scenes, and positioned as participant in or behind-the-scenes instigator of almost 
every scene that follows, Maya is the central protagonist through which the spectator accesses the 
events the film depicts, and it is her persistence in the face of sceptical colleagues and superiors that is 
shown to win out in the hunt for bin Laden. Maya is herself a kind of Rorschach test, because her 
impassive demeanour is the embodiment of ambiguity, prompting a variety of interpretations of the 
character’s motivations, psychological state(s) and emotional arc that serve contrasting readings of the 
wider movie. Two key moments are repeatedly cited in the attempt to ‘read’ Maya: her reaction to the 
torture of Ammar (Reda Kateb), an al Qaeda money man implicated in the financing of the 9/11 
attacks, which is spread across three sequences in the first third of the movie; and the film’s final shot, 
in which, after the culmination of the operation to locate and kill bin Laden, Maya sits silently in an 
empty aircraft and cries.  
 
Significantly located at the beginning and end of the character’s narrative arc in the film, these 
moments have generated confident assertions of Maya’s emotional and intellectual responses from 
some quarters. For example, for Nick James, the final close-up of Maya in the aircraft shows she is 
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undergoing the realisation ‘that shooting bin Laden has achieved nothing much’ (2013: 9); for 
Michael Boughn, she is experiencing the ‘recognition of the irreparable wound the war has inflicted 
on the nation’s soul’ (2013: 26). Yet in fact the performance and framing of the scene resists 
clarification. Maya has boarded the plane, declining to enter into a conversation with the pilot. His 
practical question, ‘Where do you want to go?’ prompts a further silence. Maya starts to breathe more 
quickly, her brow wrinkling as her eyes fill with tears. Permitting herself to cry, she closes her eyes, 
then opens them, looking off screen left and right and then forward again as the tears pass (see figure 
1). There are no words to clarify why she is crying, and no strong facial indicators of a particular 
emotion taking hold above others. Instead, multiple possibilities emerge: Agniezska Piotrowska’s 
summation of Maya’s state of mind at this moment, as ‘reflective, tired, tearful but defiant’ (2014: 
154), seems most accurate precisely because it lists all of the emotions that are possibilities based on 
the performance. Ambiguity in the performance is matched by a narrative framing that also withholds: 
Maya is in a state of suspension, between question and answer, one mission and another, one direction 
and another, past and future, a suspension that does not resolve before the credits roll (see Burgoyne 
2014: 197).2   
 
[insert figure 1 around here] 
Commentators’ readings of Maya’s reactions in the film’s torture scenes evidence a similar pattern of 
confident interpretation based on ambiguous performance cues. These scenes are perhaps the most 
controversial presence in Zero Dark Thirty. Inaugurating and located within the chain of events that 
will lead to bin Laden’s discovery and death, and viewed ‘with the benefit of hindsight’ that shows 
that the ‘intelligence is accurate,’ the torture scenes accrue, for some commentators, an undeserved 
and troubling legitimacy, or enact a problematic normalisation of so-called ‘enhanced interrogation 
techniques’ (Westwell 2013: 87, see also Maas 2012, Wolf 2013, Zizek 2013). In the torture scenes 
Maya watches, and eventually assists, as Ammar is subjected to hooding, beating, waterboarding, 
sound torture, sleep deprivation, food deprivation, sexual humiliation, light deprivation, is forced to 
wear a dog collar, and is confined to a box. Variety’s Peter Debruge characterises Maya’s body 
language in the torture scenes as child-like, and uses this as a basis for a straightforward assertion that 
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Maya is ‘clearly uncomfortable with the waterboarding and sexual humiliation that were common 
practice in the morally hazy rendition era’ (2012: para 5, emphasis added). Michael Boughn offers a 
similarly confident summation of her state of mind: ‘Young, naive, idealistic and female, she is 
compelled to prove herself in what is clearly a challenge to her moral sense’ (2013: 24, emphasis 
added). The film offers some narrative information to contextualise Boughn and Debruge’s 
characterisation of Maya as young and inexperienced but ‘compelled to prove herself’: Maya has just 
arrived, and wears inappropriate clothes to the interrogation; her resolve is indicated by her refusal of 
a coffee break mid-interrogation; she didn’t ask for the transfer to Pakistan but Washington deems her 
a ‘killer’ CIA agent. But there is little narrative or dialogue indication that she is morally challenged.  
 
Like in the final shot of the film, the performance cues that Debruge and Boughn are attempting to 
read are marked by an absence of thick emotional information. As Maya, Chastain at first looks down 
and away from Ammar as he is tortured, but later she directs her gaze more persistently at the 
spectacle of torture before her. Two traditionally self-comforting gestures (arms folded across the 
body as Ammar is water-boarded, hand massaging wrist as he is forcibly disrobed) convey the 
possibility of a felt discomfort, one that seems to be confirmed by an occasional swallowing or 
momentarily clenched jaw. Yet the absence of more communicative facial expressions or pointedly 
directed looks makes it difficult to locate the source of and motivation for Maya’s discomfort; can one 
be confident, with Boughn, that this is a moral discomfort, or could it be, as Shohini Chaudhuri 
suggests, a baser revulsion towards a dehumanised Ammar (2014: 30)?3 Boughn’s and Debruge’s 
takes on Maya’s feelings in the torture sequences exceed the performance cues presented by Chastain, 
betraying not just the commentators’ own need to ‘read’ Maya as a psychologically rounded 
character, but their impulse to ‘read’ Chastain’s performance in a manner that reflects their view of 
the wider film: in their cases, that Zero Dark Thirty’s portrayal of torture is responsible rather than 
legitimising.  
 
Across the film, Maya — and Chastain — are studiously impassive in ways that exceed narrative 
requirements. A certain steeliness of demeanour might be required in her professional, male-
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dominated, environment, for example, but Maya is equally inscrutable in private moments (watching 
television, eating alone). Her dialogue, too, is obfuscatory about the emotional dimensions of her 
experience: she only speaks about the mission. As if to underscore this inscrutability, the film 
occasionally obscures Maya’s face behind light-suffused car windows, or toilet cubicle screens; more 
frequently it holds Maya’s inexpressive face in close-up, as if, if one looked for long enough, she 
would reveal a clarifying emotional response. There is, then, a Kuleshovian structuring absence at the 
heart of Maya’s characterisation.4 Manohla Dargis claims that Maya’s ‘vacant face’ provides a 
platform for the spectator’s productive questioning of the events and actions the film depicts, an 
embodiment of the film’s progressive credentials: ‘it is an article of faith,’ she argues, ‘that viewers 
are capable of filling in the blanks, managing narrative complexity and confronting their complicity’ 
(2012: para 2, 6). Yet does this automatically follow? As we have seen, Boughn’s and Debruge’s 
readings emerge more from their own convictions, than from the evidence of the performance itself, 
implying that the absence at the heart of Chastain’s performance does not necessarily move the 
spectator towards the wider contemplation or questioning of geopolitical realities that Dargis 
imagines. Indeed, Susan Carruthers suggests that instead it is Maya around which any questioning 
clusters: ‘To the extent that Zero Dark Thirty instigates curiosity,’ she observes, ‘it’s largely directed 
toward conjuring an inner life’ for Maya, at the expense of, for example, questions about the efficacy 
and legality of torture, or the ethical and legal dimensions of extra-judicial killing (2013: 52). Herein 
lies the risk inherent in the film’s most visible presence/absence — Maya’s face — and the 
compelling mystery of the unclarified inner life it emblematises: that it directs the spectator away 
from other kinds of questions and other kinds of absences.  
 
Narrative patterns and perspectives: locating erasure 
Kathryn Bigelow has explained that the goal of Zero Dark Thirty was ‘to make a modern, rigorous 
film about counter-terrorism’ (Bigelow 2013: para 1), and she argues that this is a film that expresses 
a felt ambivalence about those counter-terrorist activities: ‘I think that it’s a deeply moral movie that 
questions the use of force. It questions what was done in the name of finding bin Laden’ (cited in 
Winter 2013: 32). The construction of Maya suggests that Bigelow is interested in deploying 
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ambiguity to prompt such questioning, but as we see from the contrasting readings cited in the 
previous section, what can result is a structural ambivalence that affirms rather than challenges 
spectators’ wider convictions.5 It is possible that Bigelow’s moral ambitions were overtaken by 
events. She and screenwriter Mark Boal originally set out to make a film about the failed attempt to 
apprehend Osama bin Laden in the Tora Bora mountain caves of Afghanistan in December 2001, 
drawing on Dalton Fury’s book Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander’s Account of the Hunt for 
the World’s Most Wanted Man (2008), a focus that would have lent itself much more obviously to a 
thematic questioning of ‘what was done in the name of finding bin Laden.’ However, as the discovery 
and killing of bin Laden in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan on May 2, 2011 came to light, 
Bigelow and Boal decided to alter the screenplay to accommodate the new events. The resulting 
film’s truth claim in its opening title card (‘The following motion picture is based on first hand 
accounts of actual events’) obscures the process of selection and omission that Bigelow and Boal went 
through to compress this new, longer timeframe into a workable feature narrative: that the ‘first hand 
accounts’ would be only from American CIA agents, keen to give a positive account of their own and 
their agency’s involvement.  
 
As a result, the narrative framework in which Maya’s characterisation sits is less ambiguous than 
Bigelow might have originally intended. The film opens with a black screen and the sounds of rising 
panic in the voices of people calling from the World Trade Center before its collapse on September 
11, 2001. This gut-wrenching invocation of terrorist-inflicted collective trauma is followed by the first 
‘enhanced interrogation,’ notably of someone with a proven connection to those attacks, a move that 
seems to connect the two events in a causal chain structured around ideas of retribution and revenge, 
rather than a questioning of torture’s efficacy. This pattern is repeated across the first half of the film, 
as the CIA’s surveillance and interrogation activities alternate with a series of terrorist attacks in 
Saudi Arabia, London, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In a rich account of the film, Robert Burgoyne has 
suggested that Zero Dark Thirty’s ‘expanding, widening loop’ of violence offers a critique of the 
‘cycle of revenge in war’ and its deleterious consequences (2014: 191-2). However, the opposite may 
also be true: the affective thickness of these moments, as the spectator’s own embodied memories of 
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their responses to specific real-world terrorist attacks converge with their sense of the implications for 
the fictional CIA agents they are watching, may move the spectator towards sympathy for the 
‘payback’ principles that drive this cycle of violence. Jonathan Lighter captures the spectator’s 
challenge well: ‘You’re left to form your own opinion,’ he observes, ‘which may be complicated by 
the scenes of al-Qaeda bombings and machine-gun attacks and Bigelow’s prefatory, black-screen 
audio of wrenching phone calls from the burning Twin Towers’ (2014: 6). The narrative patterning 
here risks producing a causal chain that exchanges moral and geopolitical complexities for reductive 
mythology: that there exists a ‘unified Islamic fundamentalist world’ (Khatib 2006: 175), and that 
terrorist attacks should provoke death-dealing in turn.  
 
This narrative patterning is also structured by omissions of pertinent aspects of the historical record — 
omissions that seem at odds with Bigelow’s stated aspirations for the film, since their absence means 
that the reductive mythology that I have suggested is potentially readable in the narrative framing is 
not explicitly challenged within the film’s dramatic action. For example, no mention is made of the 
public and political debates around the war on terror, the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq, the US drone 
programme, Guantanamo Bay or the prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib. These omissions challenge the 
spectator’s ability to see the events of the film in a wider geopolitical context, or from different points 
of view. If a narrow focus on counter-terrorist activities connected to the hunt for bin Laden might be 
presented as the motivation for such absences, a more striking omission elides the debates that were 
actually taking place within government agencies during the period the film covers, about the efficacy 
and legality of torture, debates which resulted in high profile resignations and the pulling out of FBI 
staff from interrogation sites. There is also no mention of the scores of detainee deaths during 
interrogation activities, or of the traumatic effects of torture not just on the detainees but also on the 
torturers themselves (McSweeney 2014: 39, 41). In this way, the opportunity to portray the felt 
ambivalence of either individuals or organisations about torture (a part of the extant historical record) 
is not taken up, and in its place, as Guy Westwell points out, ‘the film’s neat, chapter-like structure 
and the way in which the dogged, difficult work of the CIA investigation is set against a backdrop of 
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repeated terrorist attacks (…) lends a purifying coherence to the chaos and contingency of the recent 
past’ (2013: 86).   
 
If the project of the film is to encourage the spectator to count the costs and consequences of violence, 
then it does so through a persistently American lens that produces its own erasures. The film spends 
the majority of its running time in the CIA’s offices, screening spaces and conference rooms in the US 
embassy in Pakistan, as well as government corridors in the US, and the forward operating base in 
Afghanistan from which the attack on bin Laden was launched. This means that exterior spaces — 
outside the US embassy in Islamabad, or in the bustling streets of Rawalpindi, or the quieter locale of 
Abbottabad — are also viewed from a US perspective, often from inside the ‘US’ spaces, or through 
windows, monitors, and camera and gun sights. These ‘non-US’ spaces are filled, in the film, with 
citizens who may at any moment break into violence, from the passers-by-turned-gunmen that shoot 
at Maya’s car as she tries to leave the Islamabad office to the noisy crowd that amasses outside the 
Abbottabad compound during the raid. A scene featuring a demonstration against the CIA chief in 
Pakistan, whose identity has been revealed by the family of the victim of an American drone attack, is 
indicative of what this American perspective implies and elides. After some brief exterior whip pans 
in which the rowdy, chanting crowds fill the frame, a cut into the interior of Maya’s vehicle shows 
Maya flinching as protestors surround and repeatedly hit the car, intercut with some glimpses through 
the windscreen from her point of view. Aligned spatially and narratively with Maya, the crowds are 
difficult for the spectator to individuate, their banners and the motivations behind them difficult to 
discern clearly. As Shohini Chaudhuri has noted, as ‘presented in the film, the demonstrators are 
threatening, potentially violent terrorists filled with anti-American sentiment. There is no sense that 
protest against the drone policy could be justified, though reports have suggested that drone strikes 
routinely kill substantial numbers of civilians’ (2014: 31). The lived quotidian spaces and routines of 
non-violent civilian experience in these regions are rendered invisible, in their place a paranoid 
‘imaginative geography’ (Said, 1978) of threatening perpetrators and touchpaper environments.   
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The intense, detailed focus on procedures of intelligence gathering, surveillance, and detective work, 
‘maintains a conceit of historical neutrality’ (Zimmer 2015: 210), but in fact perpetuates the negative 
framing of spaces and peoples identified above in the film’s imaginative construction of space. 
Glimpsed in clipped segments from longer conversations, mediated through grainy footage from 
surveillance cameras or video screens, the network of detainees displayed in the interrogation videos 
Maya sifts through are depersonalised and de-contextualised. Their visible connections to family, 
community, and region are literally moved out of frame. The constrained focus of the interrogation 
questions (further constrained by their compilation into repetitions of key questions and answers by 
the film) additionally means that these detainees cannot speak the circumstances in which they have 
become radicalised or mis-identified as a terrorist suspect. Indeed, the film even obscures the 
possibility of misidentification: the detainees Maya confronts face to face are all confirmed in the film 
as connected to terrorist networks (even though some of them are not ‘fulsome’ in their replies, as she 
puts it), another choice that confirms the association of particular nationalities and ethnic groups with 
terrorism, and which also suppresses curiosity about these figures’ wider contexts: their families, 
livelihoods, and lived experiences. If, as Steven Shaviro notes, Zero Dark Thirty is to be lauded for 
making the ‘nightmare of liberal proceduralism… visible at a time when its sheer ubiquity might 
otherwise leave us to take it for granted’ (2013), there are signification portions of that ‘nightmare’ 
that remain resolutely out of frame, out of earshot, and out of mind. 
 
Somatic provocations, liminal moments: locating felt ambivalence 
So far in this chapter I have interrogated Zero Dark Thirty’s strategy of studied ambiguity, showing 
how it serves a box-office-friendly structural ambivalence,1 and how it works less to promote active 
questioning and more to reflect the spectator’s own position on the subject matter. Moreover, I have 
suggested that elements of the film’s narrative framing move beyond this achievement of structural 
ambivalence to perpetuate negative and partial representations of Middle East citizens and spaces, and 
to erase wider geopolitical contexts and the historically documented, felt ambivalence of individuals 
                                                 
1 This question of the impact of the imperative to maximise audience share on filmmaking choices is one that 
Janet Harris returns to elsewhere in this volume.  
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and organisations about aspects of counter-terrorist operations. In this final part of the essay, I want to 
argue that Bigelow’s film occasionally displays traces of an opposing movement: towards a legible, 
felt ambivalence about the counter-terrorist activities depicted. These traces can be excavated in the 
formal characteristics of certain moments of transitory pause in the film, pauses whose liminality 
thematises the idea of ethical witnessing: one during the torture of Ammar, the others during the 
searching of bin Laden’s compound.  
 
I have already argued that the torture scenes are situated within a narrative oscillation between 
terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism measures that suppresses contextual information, confers an 
impression of causality, and frames the torture scenes within a logic of revenge and retaliation. The 
shot patterns used in the torture scenes do nothing to disrupt this framing: an absence of shots from 
Ammar’s point of view, as well as a relative absence of his reaction shots, and a preponderance of 
non-verbal responses in the scripted performance, contribute to a marginalization of his subjectivity. 
The sensorially textured rendering of the physical degradation of Ammar might evoke pity, but when 
viewed alongside the dynamic physical and verbal expressivity of interrogator Dan (played by Jason 
Clarke) in the same shots, and heard alongside Dan’s forceful invocations of Ammar’s guilt and 
repeated rationalisations of torture (‘If you lie to me I’m gonna hurt you’), it cannot in itself interrupt 
Ammar’s dehumanised depiction (Chaudhury 2014: 30, Carruthers 2013: 51). Yet what does develop 
is a growing discomfort on the part of the spectator, which is rooted in the torture scenes’ somatically 
acute register. Haptic close-ups of Ammar's sweating, bleeding, beaten-up body, and the equally 
uncomfortable sounds of him choking, pleading and crying out in pain, invite an intensifying somatic 
recognition that is sustained over long moments of screen time. The wish to withdraw from these 
vividly depicted sights and sounds of physical pain is strong, and it is a wish that the film 
purposefully declines to meet, instead offering us the nightmarishly endless cycle of Dan’s 
performative shifts from violent insistence to sympathy and back again, his disturbingly fluid 
interrogator’s patter contrasting with Ammar’s guttural non-verbal pain responses.  
 
[insert figure 2 around here] 
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In the third torture scene, there is a pause in this regularized violation of the body, as Dan leaves 
Ammar, stripped humiliatingly from the waist down, alone with Maya while he fetches another 
torture instrument. In the midst of his own mortification and suffering, Ammar appeals to Maya for 
help (see figure 2). In a medium shot Ammar says quietly: ‘Your friend is an animal,’ before a cut to 
Maya shows her declining to respond in a shadowy medium shot of her own. ‘Please’ Ammar asks, 
now in close-up, ‘help me, please.’  In a medium wide shot that gradually reveals itself to be 
positioned just behind Ammar’s shoulder, Maya walks slowly and silently forward. Significantly, we 
are spatially much more closely aligned to Ammar than Maya in this sequence, and while we don’t 
share Ammar’s optical point of view, we are given full access to his emotional state through his 
expressive intonation and the close-ups of his face, and are brought into spatial alignment through the 
‘over the shoulder’ camera set-up that arrives just before Maya replies. Just for a moment, then, 
Ammar is permitted to achieve Murray Smith's conditions for character alignment: ‘spatio-temporal 
attachment and subjective access’ (2003: 83). Moreover, as a result of the spectator's accumulated, 
uncomfortable experience of the preceding torture scenes, he or she is likely to be aligned, at a 
personal, literal level, with Ammar's keenness that the torture be stopped. As Ammar and the 
spectator wait for Maya to answer, the moment becomes intensely liminal, and infused with 
possibility: how will Maya answer? In his appeal to Maya's humanity, Ammar demands from her an 
ethical form of witnessing, one that recognises his subjectivity and hers: what Kelly Oliver, in her 
Levinasian formulation, calls ‘response-ability’; in other words, the attempt to respond in ways that 
‘continually open and reopen the possibility of response’ in others (2001: 19, see Levinas 1981). 
Given the historical record that the spectator might be aware of — initial denials of certain forms of 
‘enhanced interrogation,’ and the destruction of video recordings of interrogations to deny wider 
acknowledgment of controversial interrogation practices — this call to witness takes on a particular 
significance.  
 
[insert figure 3 around here] 
Maya, Ammar, and the spectator are caught in a liminal state, between past and future action, and 
between different possible responses. Does Maya’s impassivity denote a felt ambivalence that means 
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she might show leniency, or at the least allow Ammar to cover himself? Will his pain and humiliation 
(and the sights and sounds we are being subjected to as a result) be alleviated, even if just for a 
moment? This few seconds’ pause in the cycle of violence allows the spectator to dream of a longer, 
more permanent pause. Yet when Maya does move forward to respond, she stops; right in the middle 
ground of the shot, declining the opportunity for physical proximity, for a spatial intimacy on which 
one might build dialogue and acknowledgement (see figure 3). Her verbalised response, the 
aggressively dogmatic statement, ‘You can help yourself by being truthful,’ the puritanical phrasing 
and intonation, and Chastain’s rigid physical performance, emphatically shut down the possibilities of 
the liminal pause. The spatial arrangement of the bodies in the shot — Maya in the mid ground, 
Ammar and the spectator aligned in the extreme foreground — analogises Maya’s refusal to meet 
Ammar’s demand for acknowledgement, understanding, or compassion, her refusal of ‘response-
ability’ and its potential to open up intersubjective communication. She fails to move beyond ‘seeing 
others with the objectifying gaze of a self-sufficient subject examining, subordinating, or struggling 
with the other,’ to use Oliver’s words (2001: 19). Maya’s act of witnessing does not produce a 
transformation of her subjectivity or an understanding of the brutalized other, or, at the literal level, a 
stepping-back from government sanctioned brutality. But the film invites the audience to feel the 
absence of this trajectory, the loss of this possibility, in this liminal pause between bouts of torture. In 
this way, the film invites the spectator to become the ethical witness that Maya has failed to become. 
In E. Ann Kaplan’s words, the film constructs a position for the spectator that ‘enables attention to the 
situation, as against attention merely to… individual suffering, and this positioning thus opens the text 
out to larger social and political meanings’ (2005: 125).  
 
This invitation to ‘attend to the situation’ is, as this essay has tried to suggest, not commonplace in 
Zero Dark Thirty, but it returns in the final section of the film, in the depiction of the invasion of bin 
Laden’s compound, where once again the formal strategy of the liminal pause appears. Here the pause 
is combined with a form of visual and dramatic redundancy: the spectator is forced to witness an 
action that seems to exceed what the situation requires in some way, and is forced to witness it in 
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more than one shot. Crucially, this juxtaposition of pausing and redundancy centres around the act of 
killing.  
 
As the Navy SEALs invade the compound and make their way through doors, down corridors, and up 
stairs, they kill a number of the compound occupants, some of whom are clearly shooting at or about 
to shoot at the soldiers, others not. At a number of points in this final portion of the film a pattern of 
pause and redundancy emerges. The first death of the operation occurs when Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti 
(Tushaar Mehra) shoots through a door just as the soldiers are trying to breach it. They return fire, and 
the shooting stops. Pushing through the door, they find the man lying on the floor. In a pause in the 
soldiers’ forward momentum, the soldiers circle the body, assessing the situation. A close-up shows 
he is bloodied and unresponsive, but it is at this moment, when the spectator has been shown that he is 
no longer a threat, that the soldiers fire more bullets into his body, their impact documented in the 
same close-up that has already declared them unnecessary. The second killing occurs as the soldiers 
gain entry into another part of the compound. Abrar al-Kuwaiti (Noureddine Hajjoujou) is hiding 
behind an internal wall and raises his weapon to fire, but the SEALs have spotted him using their 
infrared goggles, and several fire on him, continuing to shoot as he falls forward and onto the floor, 
dead. His wife Bushra (Nour Alkawaja), falls upon him, screaming, and picks up his rifle — perhaps 
involuntarily, or to move it out of the way, or to fire it, it is not clear. The weapon means that she, too, 
is judged as a threat, and is shot. In a lingering point of view shot through the infrared goggles of one 
of the soldiers, it becomes clear that both are dead: the prone woman’s eyes are open in a death stare, 
the man’s eyes shut, but his immobility and the extent of his chest wounds evident (see figure 4). 
Once again redundant extra shots are fired into their bodies, captured in a cut to a gloomy medium 
close-up from a different position. The minimal lighting in this shot plunges the couple’s heads into 
the shadows, stripping them of any identifying features, depersonalising them as if to underscore the 
transition from living tissue to dead matter, from personhood to absence.  
[insert figure 4 around here] 
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A pattern thus emerges: an initial flurry of activity as shots are fired, then a pause, as the soldier 
assesses whether the felled target is moving. A close-up shows, apparently incontrovertibly, that the 
person is dead, yet the soldier then fires further shots into the body. As non-specialists, it is difficult 
for the spectator to judge whether the extra shots are redundant in terms of military strategy, but the 
audience feels their redundancy in the somatic impact of watching a lifeless body momentarily re-
animated by a penetrating bullet. This redundancy is most vividly displayed in the killing of Osama 
bin Laden (Ricky Sekhon) himself. SEALs approach a doorway, and spot movement inside the room, 
firing off a shot as the soundtrack conveys the thump of a body hitting the floor. As the camera moves 
with the soldiers into the room, bin Laden is shown lying just beyond the threshold, inert. The camera 
follows the soldiers as they jump across the room to subdue two screaming women, and off-screen 
two further shots, presumably into the body of bin Laden, are heard. While the women continue to 
scream in the background, a soldier twice stands over the stilled body and fires off further shots. We 
witness the bullet impacts — that is, the unsettling redundancy of these repeated actions — in even 
closer framings that we did earlier: just the shirt-clad torso, extant bullet holes clearly visible. The 
pattern of pause and redundancy gains force through the spectator’s accumulated experience of the 
compound scenes, as well as through the specificities of the depiction of each moment; in each case 
the pause, motivated by the soldier’s need to complete a threat assessment, is a liminal moment 
between shooting and not shooting, more or less bullet holes, a more or less intact body; in each case 
(after the first) the possibility of not shooting again is thrown into relief by the next redundant bullet, 
the sense of the waste of this war on terror compounded with each extra unnecessary pull of the 
trigger. Moreover, the unnecessary bullet impacts are themselves captured in closer and closer views, 
as if the film wants to press the point home through unasked-for and repeated proximity to the haptic 
textures of the breached, dead body. 
 
It is in these moments of pause, between stillness and action, that the film’s felt ambivalence comes 
productively to the surface, pushing beyond the wider tendency towards inert ambiguity, to depictions 
that promote and demand reflection on what is possible, as well as what was done. Interrupting Zero 
Dark Thirty’s structural ambivalence, and its hermetic diegesis that elides non-American perspectives, 
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geopolitical contexts, and so much of the historical record, these moments can perhaps be seen as the 
trace of Bigelow’s original ambitions for the film. In Zero Dark Thirty’s landscape of erasure, 
absence, and ambiguity, these are the presences that complicate, that problematise, that demand 
thought and reflection on this most complex of stories. Yet their force is blunted by the contexts in 
which they sit: the film itself, and beyond it a world powerfully shaped by ideologically loaded and 
heavily politicised rhetorical oppositions between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and a US film industry equally 
powerfully shaped by economic imperatives that compel filmmakers to prioritise maximising 
audiences over overt political complexity.   
 
As this essay has shown, the film constructs a causal chain that begins with the 9/11 atrocities and 
ends with the capture and death of their architect, a choice that provides a genre-familiar revenge 
trajectory and a forceful narrative closure, even as the final shot of the film (of Maya in the plane) 
tries to work against these elements.6 Restating the juxtaposition between frame and moment that has 
characterised much of my analysis in this essay permits reflection on the challenge that Zero Dark 
Thirty faces, and the ways in which it fails this challenge. A narrative framing whose shape is familiar 
from public and political discourse, as well as from film genre conventions, exerts a gravitational 
force that pulls the spectator away from attending to the nuances of the strategies that Bigelow’s 
moral project seemed to put in play. In his positive account of the film, Michael Boughn notes that art 
should raise ‘questions that propel the mind not toward answers but toward questions’ (19), but this 
essay has argued that the partisan ‘answers’ supplied by Zero Dark Thirty’s narrative frame speak 
more loudly and more consistently than the moments that seek to invite a questioning response. Such 
analysis raises a wider question for ethically minded cultural producers: is there any longer a place for 
ambiguity and ambivalence? The lesson provided by Zero Dark Thirty’s conflicted form might well 
be that, at a cultural moment filled with the heat and noise of polarised and polarising post-9/11 
geopolitics, and in a cultural product designed for the lay spectator, the invitation to ask questions 
must surely be posed as forcefully as the many ‘answers’ that noisily circulate in public, media and 
political discourse.  
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Notes 
1 Tomasulo was discussing Apocalypse Now (Francis Ford Coppola, 1979).  
2 Indeed Robert Burgoyne suggests that the final shot makes explicit a ‘theme of suspension’ that has 
characterised the earlier scene of Osama bin Laden in the body bag: ‘This devastating scene undercuts 
any sense of triumph or blood satisfaction… In some ways we are suspended here, without resolution, 
without the climax that the film has prepared from the beginning’ (2014: 197). 
3 Susan Carruthers concurs with Chaudhuri’s reading, arguing that ‘Zero Dark Thirty may not 
“glorify” torture, as Greenwald charged, but its shit-smeared verisimilitude directs disgust more 
toward the victim than the perpetrator’ (2013: 51). 
4 Here I am referring to the ‘Kuleshov effect,’ which offers an interesting perspective on Maya’s 
performance and responses to it. The term derives from V. I. Pudovkin’s famous but perhaps 
apocryphal 1929 account of fellow Russian filmmaker Kuleshov’s montage experiment:  
‘Kuleshov and I made an interesting experiment. We took from some film or other several close-ups 
of the well-known Russian actor Mosjukhin. We chose close-ups which were static and which did not 
express any feeling at all - quiet close-ups. We joined these close-ups, which were all similar, with 
other bits of film in three different combinations. In the first combination the close-up of Mosjukhin 
was immediately followed by a shot of a plate of soup standing on a table. It was obvious and certain 
that Mosjukhin was looking at this soup. In the second combination the face of Mosjukhin was joined 
to shots showing a coffin in which lay a dead woman. In the third the close-up was followed by a shot 
of a little girl playing with afunny toy bear. We we showed the three combinations to an audience 
which had not been let into the secret the resul was terrific. The public raved about the acting of the 
artist. They pointed out the heavy pensiveness of his mood over the forgotten soup, were touched and 
moved by the deep sorrow with which he looked on the dead woman, and admired the light, happy 
smile with which he surveyed the girl at play. But we knew that in all three cases the face was exactly 
the same.’ (Pudovkin 1929, cited in Holland 1992: 79-80). 
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5 Screenwriter Mark Boal seems to equate structural ambivalence with the success of his and 
Bigelow’s moral project: that is, the inclusion of scenes in which torture seems to work, and scenes in 
which it doesn’t prove valuable. For Steve Coll, these kinds of ‘on-the-one hand, on-the-other forms 
of argument about the value of officially sanctioned torture represents a victory for those who would 
justify such abuse’ (2013). 
6 The narrative trajectory of revenge and retribution is one that spectators familiar with Hollywood 
genre films (such as Westerns, action movies, detective thrillers, and so on) will readily recognise. 
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